Estimating Demand for Cellular Phone Service under Nonlinear Pricing by Huang, Ching-I
MPRA
Munich Personal RePEc Archive
Estimating Demand for Cellular Phone
Service under Nonlinear Pricing
Ching-I Huang
National Taiwan University
October 2007
Online at http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/6459/
MPRA Paper No. 6459, posted 27. December 2007 04:36 UTC
Estimating Demand for Cellular Phone Service
under Nonlinear Pricing
Ching-I Huang∗
October 2, 2007
Abstract
Cellular phone carriers typically offer complicated nonlinear tariffs. Consumers make a
discrete choice among several rate plans. Each plan has a nonlinear price schedule, and price is
usually lower for in-network calls. I present an empirical framework to estimate demand under
such nonlinear pricing schemes by using parsimonious data and apply the estimation method to
analyze the cellular phone service market in Taiwan. Based on the estimated model, I evaluate
the impacts of termination-based pricing schemes on the market structure. While the existence
of in-network discounts causes considerable tipping effects on market shares, the effects come
primarily from reducing the average prices, not from the difference between in-network and
off-network prices. There is no evidence showing that termination-based pricing by itself has
significant effects on market structure.
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1 Introduction
Cellular phone carriers generally offer several rate plans at the same time. The price schedule
differs across rate plans. Consumers select one of the rate plans if they want to use cellular phone
service. Furthermore, the price schedule under a rate plan is typically nonlinear in quantity. A
rate plan usually involves a fixed subscription fee and unit prices, which depend on both the total
volume and the termination location of a phone call. The price of a call terminated within the
caller’s network (in-network call) is often lower than the price of a call terminated in other networks
(off-network call). The in-network discounts reduce compatibility among different networks. As a
result, consumers would prefer a large network for any given price schedule. Theoretical results
of such termination-based pricing are sensitive to model specifications1. The effect of nonlinear
pricing on market competition is thus an empirical issue. The motivation of this paper is to access
the effects of termination-based pricing schemes on the market structure.
To capture the impact of the entire nonlinear price schedule on consumer behavior, I propose
a preference-based structural model, which is conceptually similar to Miravete (2002). Consumers
are heterogeneous in their marginal utilities of making phone calls, which is determined by their
ex ante tastes and interim random shocks. The ex ante taste is known prior to the subscription
decision and is private information. This asymmetric information induces firms to screen consumers
by providing a menu of rate plans. After consumers subscribe to a rate plan from a carrier, there
are carrier-level shocks on signal quality and consumer-level shocks on taste. Both types of shocks
affect ex post taste of using cellular service. Consumers choose the volume that maximizes their
surplus under the chosen rate plan, taking into account the realized interim shocks. But because
only the distribution of the interim shocks, not the realized values, is known at the subscription
stage, consumers select a rate plan according to their expected utilities. Standard nonlinear tariff
theory ignores the time lag between the subscription decision and the volume choice, implying that
the effective price scheme is the lower envelope of all available price schedules. In the telephone
industry, however, the expected usage at the moment of subscription decision could differ from the
actual usage because of the temporal separation. Therefore, the actual payment could be above
1For example, see Laffont, Rey, and Tirole (1998), Gans and King (2001).
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the lower envelope.
While individual-level data on cellular phone consumption is preferred for this kind of empirical
analysis, they are less available to researchers. I estimate consumer demand by combining monthly
carrier-level aggregate output data with cross-sectional expenditure survey data. The market share
of a carrier can be measured in two different ways, either by the number of its subscribers or by
the total traffic volume. The first measure of market shares allows me to identify the discrete plan
choice while the second measure identifies consumers’ volume choice Distribution of iterim shocks is
inferred from the difference between the two measures. Furthermore, I incorporate the expenditure
distribution among consumers to identify the heterogeneity of their tastes. The estimation approach
is to construct moment conditions from both data sources. These moment conditions are jointly
used as constraints in the maximum likelihood estimation to obtain parameters in the behavior
model.
I apply the model to study the cellular phone service market in Taiwan, where in-network
discounts are large and common since the deregulation in 1998. In addition, the carrier of a phone
number can be easily recognized from its prefix. Therefore, callers are aware of the discounts
whenever they dial an in-network phone number. This feature allows consumers to make different
volume choices based on the termination of a phone call.
The estimation finds significant heterogeneities on the taste of cellular service among consumers.
For any given quantity of phone calls, the standard deviation of consumers’ marginal utilities is
0.0736 Taiwan dollars per second.2 Income variation can explain 9.38% of the taste variation. On
the supply side, carriers are vertically differentiated in two aspects. First, carriers differ in their
attractiveness at the subscription stage for any given level of expected surplus from making phone
calls. The monetary value of the difference between the most attractive carrier and the least one
is 447 Taiwan dollars a month. Second, carriers have different perceived signal qualities which
affect consumers’ quantity choices. The marginal utility of calling from the highest quality carrier
is higher than from the lowest quality carrier by 0.0890 Taiwan dollars per second.
Although some simplification assumptions imposed on the model seem strong, an out-of-sample
2As a comparison, the median in-network and off-network prices among all rate plans are 0.07 and 0.13 Taiwan
dollars per second, respectively.
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test shows the estimated model can approximate the observed market reasonably well. I use the
estimated model to predict monthly churn rates3 for Chunghua Telecom and find the predicted
rates are close to those observed in the data.
I perform two counterfactual simulations to evaluate the effects of termination-based pricing
schemes on the market structure. In the first simulation, I eliminate all the discounts by setting in-
network prices equal to the observed off-network prices. The simulation shows that in-network dis-
counts have a large impact on the market structure, on average increasing the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI) by 218 points in this highly concentrated market. In the second simulation, I eliminate
consumers’ ability to recognize the carrier of a receiver from the phone number. As a result, con-
sumers cannot make termination-specific quantity choices, essentially eliminating the substitution
between in-network and off-network calls caused by termination-based pricing. The second simu-
lation finds very tiny effects on the market structure. Combining these two simulations, I conclude
that in-network discounts have a large effect on the market primarily because of reducing average
prices, and the effects resulting from the price difference between in-network and off-network calls
are almost negligible.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss the related literature.
I then provide a brief background of the industry and describe the data in Section 3. The structural
model is presented in Section 4, followed by my estimation approach in Section 5. I show the
estimation results of the structural model in Section 6 and perform counterfactual simulations to
evaluation the effects of termination-based pricing in Section 7. Conclusions are in the final section.
2 Related Literature
In this section, I briefly review some previous researches on demand estimation of the telecommu-
nication industry and summarize my contributions over the previous works.
Because firms usually offer a collection of optional rate plans in the telecommunication market,
a consumer needs to make a discrete choice over rate plans, followed by a continuous choice of the
3Churn rate, as is commonly used in the industry, is the proportion of subscribers who leave a carrier during the
month.
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volume.4 Train, McFadden, and Ben-Akiva (1987) estimate a nested logit model in which plan
choice and volume choice are simultaneous, and both are discrete. Hanemann (1984) provides a
framework to estimate discrete/continuous models in which the discrete and continuous choices
are linked by the same utility maximization problem. This framework can be used to analyze
the simultaneous choices of brand and quantity, but does not account for the time lag between
plan choice and volume choice. Miravete (2002) points out the importance of this time lag. His
theoretical model provides a justification for a carrier to offer several rate plans with a nonlinear
price schedule. He examines experimental data from a local telephone company in two cities in
Kentucky. He concludes that the asymmetry of information between the firm and the consumers
about both ex ante tastes and interim shocks is significant. The monopoly uses a menu of optional
calling plans to screen consumers with respect to the ex ante tastes and nonlinear price schedule
within each plan to screen them with respect to the interim demand shocks.
My model is close to that of Narayanan, Chintagunta, and Miravete (2007), who analyze demand
for local telephone service. As in my model, they assume that interim shocks are observed after the
plan choice. They use subscriber-level data on consumption choices to obtain model parameters,
while my data are more aggregate. Economides, Seim, and Viard (2006) study local phone service
in a competitive environment using phone bill information from a survey of residential customers
in New York State. The moment conditions from the plan choice and from the volume choice are
jointly estimated. However, they do not explicitly account for the time separation between plan
choice and volume choice. Similarly, Iyengar (2004) uses subscriber-level billing records from a
cellular phone carrier to study demand for wireless service. The difference between ex-ante optimal
volume and ex-post actual volume is modelled as white noise, independent of other variables. In
my framework, the difference results from interim shocks and is endogenously determined by a
consumer’s taste and the price schedule of the chosen rate plan.
Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) propose a parsimonious empirical approach to analyze dis-
crete choice with heterogeneous consumers using brand-level aggregate data. They recover the
average utility level of each product from observed market shares. In their model, there is no
4Some earlier studies on cellular phone demand abstract away the volume choice by assuming all subscribers make
the same amount of phone calls. (Parker and Ro¨ller, 1997; Hausman, 1997)
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quantity choice. Consumers are assumed to purchase a single unit of one product. This is ap-
propriate for the automobile market they study. Their approach has been adapted to study price
discrimination with discrete quantity (or quality) choice in Broadway theatre (Leslie, 2004), paper
towers (Cohen, 2001), and specialty coffee (McManus, 2006). Nonetheless, this approach has to
be modified if consumers purchase different quantities and the quantity choice is on a continuous
spectrum. Nair, Dube´, and Chintagunta (2005) account for the continuous quantity choice in the
refrigerated juice market. As in the discrete/continuous choice model, the discrete brand choice
and the continuous quantity choice are linked by specifying the utility function. Different from the
telephone service market, however, consumers make these two choices simultaneously.
To my knowledge, there are very few pervious studies to quantify the effect of in-network
discounts on market demand. By using reduced-form estimation, Kim and Kwon (2003) and
Fu (2004) find that large networks are more attractive to consumers. However, it is difficult to
separate the effect of in-network discounts from other factors such as reputation. By using carrier-
level subscription data, Grajek (2003) proposes a structural model to estimate network effects in
the Polish mobile phone industry. By comparing the network effects before and after in-network
discounts are eliminated in the market, he finds a significant increase in compatibility among
carriers.
3 The Cellular Phone Service in Taiwan
This section briefly illustrates the cellular phone service market in Taiwan and describes the data.
The research period in the empirical part of this study is between May 2000 and June 2005.
3.1 Cellular Carriers
I focus on GSM carriers5 since they dominate the wireless telephone service in Taiwan. The
industry is regulated through licenses by the Directorate General of Telecommunications. During
the research period, the number of GSM licences is fixed. The regulator divides Taiwan into North,
5GSM (global system for mobile communications) is a digital technology to transmit mobile voice and data. It
is one of the second generation wireless systems and is the most widely used technology in the world for mobile
telephones.
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Table 1: Operational regions and market shares by carrier
Operational Regions Market Shares
Carrier North Central South by Subscribers by Volume
Chunghwa Telecom × × × 0.308 0.345
Taiwan Cellular × × × 0.256 0.249
Far Eastone × × × 0.182 0.173
KG Telecommunication × × × 0.148 0.169
Trans Asia × 0.066 0.044
Mo Bi Tai × 0.029 0.024
Notes: The market shares are the medians of monthly market shares between May 2000 and June
2005.
Central, and South regions.6 There are four national carriers, Chunghwa Telecom (CHT), Taiwan
Cellular (TCC), Far Eastone Telecommunications (FET), and KG Telecommunications (KGT),
and two regional carriers, Trans Asia Telecommunications (TAT) and Mo Bi Tai Communications
(MBT). See Table 1 for their operational regions and market shares. Besides GSM system, there are
other types of wireless telephone systems in Taiwan, PHS and 3G. The number of their subscribers
are both less than 4% of the number of GSM subscribers.7Expect for qualities, the products are
essentially identical among the GSM carriers. Since their service is operated on the same wireless
technology, consumers can switch between them without purchasing a new handset.8
Within the research period, the number of firms operating GSM service has fallen from six to
three. Taiwan Cellular acquired a regional carrier, Trans Asia, in May 2001. Far Eastone acquired
KG Telecommunications in January 2004. In August 2004, Taiwan Cellular acquired another
6The counties and cities included in each of the three regions are (1) North Region: Keelung, Taipei, Taoyuan,
Hsinchu, Yilan, Hualien, and Lienchiang; (2) Central Region: Miaoli, Taichung, Changhua, Nantou, and Yunlin;
(3) South Region: Chiayi , Tainan, Kaohsiung, Pingtung, Taitung, Penghu, and Kinmen. The proportion of the
population is 45% in the North Region, 25% in the Central Region, and 30% in the South.
7PHS (personal handy-phone system) is generally considered inferior to GSM because of its lower power and
smaller coverage area. First International Telecom, which began its PHS service in June 2001, is the only firm
operating a PHS system. Its coverage area is limited to some metropolitan areas. 3G stands for the third generation
wireless system. Five national 3G licenses were auctioned off by the Directorate General of Telecommunications in
January 2002. Three of them were acquired by the incumbent GSM operators, Chunghwa Telecom, Taiwan Cellular,
and Far Eastone. An entrant, Asia Pacific Broadband Wireless Communications, launched its 3G service in July
2003. Other carriers did not begin operating 3G service until July 2005. To be more precise, there is also an obsolete
system during the research period, called CT2 (the second generation cordless telephony). Its market share has
always been less than 0.2% and keeps decreasing during the research period.
8In particular, handsets are not locked to a specific carrier. Therefore, handsets are compatible with all GSM
carriers. The compatibility substantially reduces switching costs among these carriers.
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regional carrier, Mo Bi Tai. Nevertheless, these acquired carriers still operate as a separate brand
in the market. In particular, their price schemes are different from the acquiring carriers’ price
schemes. Furthermore, in-network discounts apply to phone calls between the acquired network
and the acquiring network only in some rate plans.
All cellular phone networks are interconnected with each other. They are also interconnected
with other types of telephone services such as landline telephone networks. Therefore, a customer
in one network can make a call to a receiver in any other network. Because the carrier of a receiver
can be recognized by the caller from the prefix of the phone number, it is easy to make different
consumption choices when the price depends on the receiver’s network.
3.2 Output Data
Carrier-level output data come from Monthly Statistics of Transportation and Communications
published by the Ministry of Transportation and Communications of the Taiwan government. The
Directorate General of Telecommunications requires each GSM operator to report the number of
active subscribers and the total volume of calls originated from the carrier every month since May
2000.9 In addition, the numbers of landline telephone subscribers and PHS10 subscribers are also
reported in the monthly statistics. Nevertheless, there is no reliable monthly output data of 3G
service before March 2006. The number of 3G subscribers is available only in the annual statistics.
3.3 Rate Plans
I collect all of the rate plans offered by GSM carriers during the research period. All carriers
publicly announce their current rate plans on their websites. Previous rate plans are obtained
through direct contacts and from reports on newspapers and magazines. Among these sources, a
consumer magazine Call: Fashion Communications Magazine reports the rate plans of all carriers
regularly since 2001.
9The volume of Far Eastone in the first two months (May and June, 2000) is substantially higher than that in
the following months. I suspect that both incoming calls and outgoing calls were counted in the reported numbers.
Therefore, I divide the reported values by two to correct the data. In addition, the volume of Chunghwa Telecom
appears to have a one-month lag. I shift this series backward by one month.
10CT2 subscribers are included in the same category as PHS users. I do not treat them differently in the estimation
because CT2 users only account a very small share in this category.
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Table 2: Number of rate plans by carrier
Carrier 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Chunghwa Telecom 5 10 10 10 11 11
Taiwan Cellular 5 9 9 10 9 14
Far Eastone 10 11 7 12 13 16
KG Telecommunications 8 10 9 10 11 8
Trans Asia 8 9 9 10 9 10
Mo Bi Tai 9 7 8 8 8 9
Notes: The numbers on the table are the numbers of rate plans in May of the
year.
All prices are adjusted to 2001 Taiwan dollars (TWD) using the monthly consumer price index.11
During the research period, the exchange rate as compared to U.S. dollars (USD) has been between
30.7 TWD and 35.1 TWD per USD.
Table 2 summarizes the number of the rate plans by carrier. National carriers always offer the
same menu of rate plans regardless the region of a customer. Each carrier provides about 10 rate
plans at a given month. There is a slowly increasing trend in the number of plans as more non-voice
services are introduced into the market. In addition to the price of voice service, rate plans are
differentiated in the price of non-voice service.
All rate plans have a structure similar to a two-part tariff. Once subscribing to a rate plan, a
positive fixed monthly fee is charged in almost all plans. Consumers only pay for outgoing calls,
but not incoming calls. Contrary to a typical two-part tariff, there are distinct marginal prices for
in-network and off-network calls, respectively. In addition, there are generally thresholds in a rate
plan such that, for volumes less than the thresholds, the total phone tariff is simply the flat monthly
fee. The positive marginal prices are applied only to quantities above the thresholds. There are
various forms of the thresholds. Some plans provide free allowances, which specify the time length
of free usage. The amounts of the free allowance for in-network and off-network calls can be either
combined or separated, depending on the plan design. Other plans specify the threshold in the
dollar amount, called deduction. Only the portion of the usage charge above the deduction amount
11The price index is published by the Directorate-General of Budget, Accounting and Statistics. The consumer
price level is very stable. The index has been between 98.8 and 103.4 during the research period.
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Table 3: Average in-network discounts by carrier
Carrier 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Chunghwa Telecom 0.466 0.441 0.441 0.441 0.468 0.468
Taiwan Cellular 0.373 0.463 0.463 0.440 0.463 0.483
Far Eastone 0.468 0.475 0.469 0.587 0.572 0.562
KG Telecommunications 0.515 0.497 0.534 0.527 0.514 0.469
Trans Asia 0.437 0.437 0.500 0.450 0.389 0.377
Mo Bi Tai 0.298 0.422 0.452 0.369 0.369 0.328
Notes: The discounts are computed from comparing the marginal price of an in-
network call with that of a call terminated in a rival GSM network in May of the
year.
is counted in the phone bill. Since all plans have only very limited off-peak periods, I ignore off-peak
rates. This simplification causes an upward bias of the price.
Most rate plans charge a lower price for calls terminated within the own network. As Table 3
shows, in-network prices are close to 50% of off-network prices. The significant price differences
between in-network and off-network calls provide consumers incentives to identify the carrier of the
receiver while dialing a phone number.
3.4 Consumer Expenditure
The 2002 Survey of Family Income and Expenditure was conducted by the Directorate-General
of Budget, Accounting and Statistics. The universal sampling rate is 0.20%, which is 13,681
households. The survey provides information on annual telecommunication expenditure and annual
income at the household level. To account for variation of consumer tastes across regions, household
income is used as a proxy to control the differences in socioeconomic status. Based on the survey
data, I obtain the distribution of telecommunication expenditure conditional on income, which will
be used in the estimation to identify the heterogeneity of consumer tastes.
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4 Behavior Model
My model focuses on the demand for voice service in the cellular industry. Given a consumer’s
taste, this section derives her plan and quantity choices. Integrating the choices over all consumers,
I obtain market shares for each carrier, measured in the number of subscribers and in the traffic
volume.
4.1 Timeline of Events
The events in a billing period (a month) occur in the following order.
1. Each carrier announces a menu of rate plans. Consumers know their ex ante taste.
2. Consumers simultaneously subscribe to one (if any) of the rate plans available in their region.
Carriers activate the service for consumers.
3. Random quality shocks for each carrier and random taste shocks for each consumer occur.
4. Consumers make phone calls and pay the tariff.
4.2 The Market Supply
The carriers of cellular phone service, determined by the regulator, vary across the three regions
R ≡ {North,Central, South}. Let Kr denote the set of GSM brands operating in region r.
Although some carriers are acquired by others, they still operate as a different network brand in
the market. I will treat them as separate carriers in the estimation.
Rate plans are treated as exogenous in the model. I justify this assumption by the fact that
changes on the plans have to be reported to the regulator and publicly announced before they take
effect. As a consequence, firms cannot respond to interim shocks when the shocks are revealed. For
any given carrier, it offers an identical menu of rate plans to all regions where it operates. Denote
the set of rate plans offered by network k at time t as Pkt. For any carrier, the quality of service is
the same regardless the chosen rate plan.
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I simplify the tariff formula so that in-network and off-network usages are additively separable.
The payment of using qI in-network minutes and qO off-network minutes of plan p at time t is
T¯pt(q
I , qO) =MFpt + p
I
ptmax{q
I − aIpt, 0}+ p
O
ptmax{q
O − aOpt, 0}, (1)
where aIpt and a
O
pt are free allowances for in-network and off-network calls, respectively; MFpt is the
monthly fee.12 When the usage is less than free allowances (qI < aIpt, q
O < aOpt), a customer faces
zero marginal payment and pays the flat monthly feeMFpt. Beyond the thresholds, the per-second
marginal payment is pIpt for in-network calls and p
O
pt for off-network calls.
4.3 The Market Demand
Consumers in the market are all individuals in the economy. Let Ct denote the set of all consumers
at time t. POPt ≡ |Ct| is the population.
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The value of cellular phone service increases in the number of potential receivers. Since all
networks are interconnected, the destination of a call can be either in a wireless network or in
a landline network. Denote the set of all potential receivers at period t as Dt, which includes
subscribers of all telephone networks.
The cost of switching to a different rate plan or a different carrier in the next period is assumed
to be zero.14 Therefore, consumers make decisions independently over time. After I estimate the
model, I will provide evidence on the restrictiveness of this assumption.
12For rate plans with other forms of thresholds, I divide the free allowances into aIpt and a
O
pt in proportion to the
respective network sizes. This simplification causes a slightly upward bias of the tariff. In addition, I transform
per-minute rates into per-second rates since most plans are based on per-second rates.
13I use the population registration data from the Ministry of the Interior.
14In practice, consumers can change to a different rate plan within the same carrier almost costless by calling the
customer service line. However, the actual cost of switching to another carrier might be positive even though all
carriers had reduced the activation fee to zero by 2002. A considerable proportion of customers have a one-year or
two-year contract with their carrier in exchange for handset subsidy. In addition, number portability has not taken
effect in Taiwan during the research period. The inconvenience of changing a phone number is also part of switching
costs.
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4.3.1 Consumer Preferences
Consumers are vertically differentiated in their utility of using cellular service. The taste of cellular
service depends on (a) a consumer’s ex ante taste θit, (b) an interim taste shock νit, and (c) the
signal quality of her carrier ηkt. The singal quality is identical to all customers of a carrier.
The surplus of consumer i ∈ Ct subscribing to rate plan p ∈ Pkt of network k ∈ Kr at time t
can be expressed as ∑
j∈Dit
u(xijt; θit, ηkt, νit)− αT¯pt(xit) + δkt + εikt, (2)
where Dit ⊂ Dt is a consumer-specific set of receivers, and xit ≡ (xijt : j ∈ Dit) is the vector of
i’s volume choice of phone calls to all receivers. Each consumer has a balanced calling pattern15.
In other words, the share of each network within Dit is the same as the market share in the entire
economy Dt.
In 2 u(xijt; θit, ηkt, νit) is the utility associated with calling a receiver j ∈ Dit. It is additively
separable across receivers. In the second term of (2), T¯pt(xit) is the total payment of making
xit calls under the rate plan and α is the marginal disutility of payment. Since expenditure on
cellular phone services is a small proportion of the household income16, it is reasonable to consider
a quasi-linear model in which consumers are risk-neutral about the phone tariff variation. The
third term δkt is a fixed effect for subscription of network k at time t, which is identical to all
consumers. This term captures all carrier characteristics which do not affect the volume choice,
such as advertisements, customer service, handset subsidies, reputation, . . . etc. The final term εikt
is consumer i’s idiosyncratic preference of carrier k. It is i’s private information and is independent
of other observable variables. Incoming calls do not affect u(xijt; θit, ηkt, νit). However, their effects
can be captured by the fixed effect δkt. This assumption implies the utility from incoming calls is
identical for all subscribers in the same network.
The surplus in (2) can be decomposed into two parts: (i) the surplus from making phone calls,∑
j∈Dit
u(xijt; θit, ηkt, νit)−αT¯pt(xit) and (ii) the surplus from subscription, δkt+εikt. Only the first
15The assumption of a balanced calling pattern is used in most theoretical papers, such as Laffont et al. (1998) and
Gans and King (2001). Equation (2) would understate the surplus of subscribing to regional carriers if the network
shares in Dit are the regional market shares instead of national market shares.
16The average household expenditure on telecommunications is 1.88% of income in 2002.
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one depends on the volume choice.
To obtain a tractable econometric model, I assume that consumer i’s utility associated with
making xijt seconds of calls from network k to receiver j ∈ Dit at period t is
u(xijt; θit, ηkt, νit) =
1
b
(θit + ηkt + νit + 1− log xijt)xijt.
It depends on the quantity xijt and the consumer’s ex post taste, which is determined by ex ante
taste, θit, and interim shocks, ηkt and νit. The marginal utility is
u′(xijt; θit, ηkt, νit) =
1
b
(θit + ηkt + νit − log xijt) .
As a result, variation in taste shifts a consumer’s marginal utility function vertically. I have
normalized the utility of no consumption to zero for all consumers, u(0; θit, ηkt, νit) = 0 for all θit,
ηkt, and νit.
The distribution of ex ante taste θit depends on household income Ii. In principle, I can add
other demographic variables, but the number of parameters in the model will increase exponentially,
resulting the curse of dimensionality in estimation. The variable Ii can be viewed as a proxy for
individual i’s overall socioeconomic status. Denote the conditional distribution function of θit by
Fθ|I . It is normal with mean µθ|Ii and variance σ
2
θ|Ii
.
θit|Ii ∼ N
(
µθ|Ii, σ
2
θ|Ii
)
. (3)
Since the income distribution varies across regions, the marginal distribution of θit differs across
regions as well. Nonetheless, the income distribution is fixed over time in the model, implying the
distribution of ex ante taste types θit is stable over time.
The random shocks, ηkt and νit, are revealed after a rate plan p has been chosen at the beginning
of a month. The first shock ηkt is an index for the perceived signal quality of carrier k at time t.
For instance, equipment failure in a network results in a lower realized value. Suppose the quality
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index has a joint normal distribution in every period,
ηt ∼ N(η¯t,Ση), (4)
where ηt ≡ (ηkt : k ∈ K) denotes the random vector of the quality indices; its mean is η¯t ≡
(η¯kt : k ∈ K) with η¯kt = η
0
k + η
0
t . A carrier-specific parameter η
0
k accounts for heterogeneity of
perceived qualities across carriers. A time dummy η0t captures market-wide factors which influence
the willingness to pay at time t. The variance of the shock is assumed to be σ2η for all carriers. The
correlation coefficients of ηkt between any two carriers are assumed to be ρη. These random quality
shocks ηkt are independent over time and independent of other variables.
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The second shock νit captures some unexpected personal events, such as being sick, which affect
individual taste after committing to a rate plan. Its distribution is
νit ∼ N
(
0, σ2ν
)
. (5)
It is independent of all other variables. In addition, it is also independent across individuals i and
over time t.
Consumers may choose to stay away from any GSM network. Denote the outside option as
k = 0. Let K0r ≡ Kr ∪ {0} be the choice set in region r, including the outside option. Normalize
the fixed effect of the outside option to be δ0t = 0. Hence, the surplus of no subscription is εi0t.
I assume that the idiosyncratic preferences εikt follows a nested logit model. The first nest is the
choice between subscription to any carrier and no subscription. The second nest after subscription
is the choice among all carriers in a consumer’s region. Finally, a consumer picks up the rate plan
with the highest surplus from the chosen carrier. Specifically, the distribution function of (εikt) is
Fε(εi0t, εi1t, εi2t, . . . ) = exp

− exp(−εi0t)−

∑
k∈Kr
exp
(
−
εikt
σε
)
σε

 (6)
with 0 < σε ≤ 1. The parameter σε measures the degree of the differentiation among the rate plans
17For instance, higher market share will not cause congestion that lowers the quality.
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relative to the on-off decision. When σε = 1, this model becomes the standard multinomial logit
model.
4.3.2 Volume Decision
As in any sequential game, I solve a consumer’s choice problem backward. Consider the volume
decision conditional on subscribing to rate plan p of network k at time t. The volume choices are
determined by maximizing the surplus from making calls, which is the first two terms in the surplus
function (2). Denote this part of the surplus as
µ˜pt(θit, ηkt, νit,Dit) ≡ max
xit
∑
j∈Dit
u(xijt; θit, ηkt, νit)− αT¯pt(xit). (7)
Both the tariff schedule (1) and the utility of making phone calls are additively separable across
receivers. In addition, consumers can recognize the carrier of a receiver. Therefore, the volume
choice xijt for an individual receiver j can be expressed as
xijt =


xIpt(θit, ηkt, νit,Dit) if j’s network is eligible for in-network discounts;
xOpt(θit, ηkt, νit,Dit) if j’s network is not eligible for in-network discounts.
The volume choices solve the following maximization problem.
[
xIpt(θit, ηkt, νit,Dit), x
O
pt(θit, ηkt, νit,Dit)
]
≡
arg max
[xI ,xO]
|Dit|
|Dt|
N Iptu(x
I ; θit, ηkt, νit)+
|Dit|
|Dt|
NOptu(x
O; θit, ηkt, νit)−αTpt
(
|Dit|
|Dt|
N Iptx
I ,
|Dit|
|Dt|
NOptx
O
)
,
(8)
where N Ipt is the total size of networks eligible for in-network discounts and N
O
pt is the size of all
other networks. The expected network sizes, N Ipt and N
O
pt , are fulfilled at equilibrium.
The relative size of a consumer’s receivers, |Dit|/|Dt|, cannot be separately identified from her
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ex ante taste θit. The surplus from calling conditional on rate plan p in (8) can be expressed as
∑
n=I,O
|Dit|
|Dt|
Nnpt
b
{[θit + ηkt + νit + 1− log x
n]xn} − αTpt
(
|Dit|
|Dt|
N Iptx
I ,
|Dit|
|Dt|
NOptx
O
)
=
∑
n=I,O
Nnpt
b
{[
θit+log
(
|Dit|
|Dt|
)
+ηkt+νit+1−log
(
|Dit|
|Dt|
xn
)]
|Dit|
|Dt|
xn
}
−αTpt
(
N Ipt
|Dit|
|Dt|
xI , NOpt
|Dit|
|Dt|
xO
)
.
When we compare the surplus and the total in-network and off-network volumes, there is no
distinction between a type-θit consumer who makes (x
I , xO) calls to a set of subscribers Dit and
a type-(θit + log(|Dit|/|Dt|)) consumer who makes ((|Dit|/|Dt|)x
I , (|Dit|/|Dt|)x
O) calls to every
subscriber in the economy. Therefore, I assume Dit = Dt for all consumers and suppress Dit from
the notation.
Because the tariff formula (1) has kinks when volumes equal to the free allowances aIpt and/or
aOpt, the quantity choice functions have flat regions. The demand function of a type-θit consumer
with shocks (ηkt, νit) is
xnpt(θit, ηkt, νit) =


exp (θit + ηkt + νit) , if ηkt + νit < A
n
1 (θit)
anpt
Nnpt
, if An1 (θit) ≤ ηkt + νit < A
n
2 (θit)
exp
(
θit + ηkt + νit − αbp
n
pt
)
, if ηkt + νit ≥ A
n
2 (θit)
(9)
for n = I,O, where the boundaries are
An1 (θit) ≡ log
(
anpt
Nnpt
)
− θit and A
n
2 (θit) ≡ log
(
anpt
Nnpt
)
− θit + αbp
n
pt.
The total volume of calls originating from the consumer is18
q˜pt(θit, ηkt, νit) ≡ N
I
ptx
I
pt(θit, ηkt, νit) +N
O
ptx
O
pt(θit, ηkt, νit), (10)
18The physical constraint, q˜pt(θit, ηkt, νit) ≤ 30× 24× 60× 60 (the total seconds in a month), is abstracted away.
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and the tariff is
T˜pt(θit, ηkt, νit)
=T¯pt
(
N Iptx
I
pt(θit, ηkt, νit) , N
O
ptx
O
pt(θit, ηkt, νit)
)
=MFpt +
∑
n=I,O
{
1{ηkt + νit ≥ A
n
2 (θit)} p
n
pt
[
Nnpt exp
(
θit + ηkt + νit − αbp
n
pt
)
− anpt
]}
. (11)
There is a closed-form formula for the surplus from calling,
µ˜pt(θit, ηkt, νit) = −αMFpt +
∑
n=I,O
{
1{ηkt + νit < A
n
1 (θit)}
[
Nnpt
b
eθit+ηkt+νit
]
+ 1{An1 (θit)≤ηkt+νit<A
n
2 (θit)}
anpt
b
[
θit+ηkt+νit+1−log
(
anpt
Nnpt
)]
+ 1{ηkt + νit ≥ A
n
2 (θit)}
[
Nnpt
b
eθit+ηkt+νit−αbp
n
pt + αpnpta
n
pt
]}
. (12)
4.3.3 Discrete Choice of Rate Plans
At the beginning of a month, consumers choose one of the rate plans available in their home region
or not to subscribe at all. The choice set includes all plans offered by carriers operating in the
region, ∪k∈K0rPkt.
Because the value of the shocks (ηkt and νit) are unknown to consumers at the moment of
subscription, consumers pick up the rate plan which maximizes their expected surplus.
max
k∈K0r
max
p∈Pkt
{Eη,ν [µ˜pt(θit, ηkt, νit)] + δkt + εikt} .
Under the normality assumption of ηkt and νit, I can compute closed-form expressions for the
expected surplus from calling Eη,ν [µ˜pt(θit, ηkt, νit)] from equation (12).
Let pikt(θit) ∈ Pkt denote the plan choice of a type-θit consumer who has subscribed to carrier
k.
pikt(θit) = arg max
p∈Pkt
{Eη,ν [µ˜pt(θit, ηkt, νit)]}. (13)
Thus, putting equations (10) and (13) together, the total volume of phone calls originating from
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the consumer is
qkt(θit, ηkt, νit) = q˜pikt(θit),t(θit, ηkt, νit).
Similarly, the tariff paid by the consumer is
Tkt(θit, ηkt, νit) = T˜pikt(θit),t(θit, ηkt, νit),
and the surplus from calling is
µkt(θit, ηkt, νit) = µ˜pikt(θit),t(θit, ηkt, νit).
A taste-θit consumer in region r selects carrier k ∈ Kr if and only if
Eη,ν [µkt(θit, ηkt, νit)] + δkt + εikt ≥ Eη,ν [µk′t(θit, ηk′t, νit)] + δk′t + εik′t, (14)
for any k′ ∈ K0r . Given the nested logit assumption on the idiosyncratic preferences εikt, the market
share of carrier k among consumers with ex ante taste θ in region r is
skrt(θ) =
[∑
k′∈Kr
exp
(
Eη,ν [µk′t(θ,η,ν)]+δk′t
σε
)]σε
1 +
[∑
k′∈Kr
exp
(
Eη,ν [µk′t(θ,η,ν)]+δk′t
σε
)]σε exp
(
Eη,ν [µkt(θ,η,ν)]+δkt
σε
)
∑
k′∈Kr
exp
(
Eη,ν [µk′t(θ,η,ν)]+δk′t
σε
) ,
and the share of the outside option is
s0rt(θ) =
1
1 +
[∑
k′∈Kr
exp
(
Eη,ν [µk′t(θ,η,ν)]+δk′t
σε
)]σε .
The national market share is the weighted average over all regions. Let Pr(r|I) be the proportion
of the population in region r conditional on the income I. Then,
skt(I, θ) =
∑
r∈R
Pr(r|I)skrt(θ) (15)
is the national market share for carrier k at time t conditional on income I and ex ante taste θ.
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Table 4: Variable definition for the structural estimation
Name Description
Carrier-Level Output Data
SUBkt Number of subscribers in network k at time t
V OLkt Volume of calls originated from network k during period t
Household Survey Data
EXPM (I) Mean of telecommunication expenditure condition on income I
EXPV (I) Variance of telecommunication expenditure condition on I
Other Data
POPt Population at time t
5 Estimation Approach
Similar to the concept of Berry et al. (1995), I can compute the fixed effect for subscription δkt and
the signal quality ηkt from the observed data by inversion. I then derive the likelihood function for
the observed carrier-level volumes. The conditions imposed by the observed numbers of subscribers
and by the distribution of household expenditure are used as constraints in the estimation. Table
4 summarizes the definitions for the observed variables.
I partition the parameters in the model into three sets (∆δ,Θ,Φ). First, let δ denote the vector
of all carrier-time fixed effects for subscription {δkt : k ∈ K, t ∈ T}. Second, I discretize the income
space into a finite set I. Let Θ ≡ {µθ|I , σ
2
θ|I : I ∈ I} denote the conditional mean and variance of
ex ante taste types θ for each income level I ∈ I. Third, use Φ to denote the remaining parameters
in the model. My estimation strategy is to express the first parameter set δ as a function of Θ
and Φ from the condition implied by the observed numbers of subscribers SUBkt, and then express
the second parameter set Θ as a function of Φ from the condition implied by the expenditure
distribution, EXPM (I) and EXPV (I). As a result, all the parameters can be expressed in term
of the third parameter set Φ. The last step is to estimate Φ by maximizing the likelihood of the
observed volumes V OLkt.
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Figure 1: Mean and standard deviation of annual expenditure on telecommunications
5.1 Econometric Specifications
I consider only voice service of cellular phones. Although the percentage of revenue from non-voice
service grows steadily, voice service (plus the fixed monthly fee) still accounts for the vast majority
of revenue in the industry.19
In addition to GSM networks, the set of potential receivers Dt includes subscribers of landline
phones and PHS phones. 3G users are ignored due to lack of reliable monthly data.20 International
calls are also excluded.21 All calls are assumed to originate from the home region of a consumer.
Roaming service is neglected.
The conditional mean and variance of telecommunication expenditures (EXPM (I) and EXPV (I)),
shown in Figure 1, are obtained by kernel regression.
Nonetheless, the expenditure survey reports the money amount spent by households on all
19For example, the proportion of revenue from non-voice services was below 5% for Chunghua Telecom every
month between September 2001 and June 2005. See Operation Data for Most Recent 12 Months of Chunghua
Telecom (http://www.cht.com.tw/CompanyCat.php?CatID=274).
20There is only one 3G carrier and its market share is small during the research period.
21Calls terminated outside Taiwan account for a small portion of the telephone traffic in terms of outgoing minutes
although the ratio keeps growing (2000: 1.1%, 2001: 1.7%, 2002: 2.7%, 2003: 4.3%). See Directorate Generate of
Telecommunications (2004).
21
0
.
05
.
1
.
15
.
2
2000Jan 2001Jan 2002Jan 2003Jan 2004Jan 2005Jan
CHT TCC
FET KGT
TAT MBT
S
u
b
sc
ri
b
er
s/
P
o
p
o
la
ti
o
n
Month
Figure 2: Number of subscribers by carrier
telecommunication services, not just cellular phone. I assume the expenditure on cellular phone
service is a constant fraction λ (to be estimated) of the telecommunication budget for all individ-
uals22.
Carrier-level output data from the Directorate General of Telecommunications include both
residential users and business users while the expenditure survey only covers the former ones. I
assume that each carrier has the same proportion of residential users among their subscribers.
In addition, the proportion of the volume originated from residential users is the same as the
the proportion of residential subscribers. This proportion can be computed for each December
between 1999 and 2004 by comparing the number of wireless subscribers in the Directorate General
of Telecommunications output data23 with that in the annual family survey data. For other months,
the proportion is obtained by linear interpolation. The median proportion of residential subscribers
is 0.47. The output variables, SUBkt and V OLkt, refer to residential users in the market. Figures
2 and 3 shows the observed series of these two variables normalized by the population.
22A sufficient condition to obtain a constant share of the expenditure on cellular phone is that (a) all consumers
have the same homothetic preferences between cellular phone service and other telecommunications services and (b)
prices are linear.
23Directorate Generate of Telecommunications (2005) provides the total number of wireless subscribers, including
GSM, PHS, and 3G, at the end of each year.
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Figure 3: Outgoing volume by carrier
5.2 The Condition on Numbers of Subscribers
For any given parameters Θ and Φ, I use numbers of subscribers SUBkt to recover the carrier-time
fixed effects for subscription δkt. By equating the observed number of subscribers (normalized by
the population) to the number predicted in the model, I have
SUBkt
POPt
=
∫∫
skt(I, θ; δt,Θ,Φ) dFθ|I dFI , ∀k, t. (16)
For each period, I have a system of equations. The value of the vector δt(Θ,Φ) = {δkt(Θ,Φ) : k ∈
K} can be inverted from these equations for each t.24 Similar to Berry et al. (1995, p. 865), I can
construct a contraction mapping to solve for δt recursively. The contraction mapping also implies
δt is well-defined for any given observed value of SUBkt.
In principle, I can stop here and estimate the demand model by the generalized method of
moments as in Berry et al. (1995) if I have enough valid instruments for carrier characteristics.
24If switching costs are positive (for instance, a long-term contract with their carrier) for some consumers, the
fixed effects δkt might be overestimated. Nonetheless, this bias depends on the correlation of preferences over time.
If preferences are similar over time, most consumers would choose the same carrier and switching costs have little
effect. I will use the observed churn rates to evaluate the restrictiveness of assuming zero switching costs in Section
6.2.
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Unfortunately, this approach requires a huge number of instruments in my model. Furthermore,
identification of the quantity choice and taste heterogeneity only relies on the functional form as-
sumption, not the observed data. Next, I show how to overcome the shortcomings by incorporating
data on the expenditure and on the volumes.
5.3 The Condition on Expenditure Distribution
Heterogeneities among consumers are identified from cross-sectional survey data. Average taste
strength determines the mean expenditure. Similarly, dispersion of taste affects the variance of ex-
penditure. Therefore, I invert the first and second moments of expenditure to obtain the parameter
set Θ, i.e. the mean µθ|I and the variance σ
2
θ|I of ex ante taste for any given income level I.
The mean expenditure in the year 2002 conditional on income I is
λEXPM (I) ≡
1
#{i : Ii = I}
∑
{i:Ii=I}
∑
t∈2002
∑
k∈K
1{κit = k}Tkt(θit, ηkt, νit; Θ,Φ)
p
−→ Eε,θ,ν
[ ∑
t∈2002
∑
k∈K
1{piit = p}Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν; Θ,Φ)
∣∣∣∣∣I
]
=
∑
t∈2002
∑
k∈K
Eθ
[
skt(I, θ; Θ,Φ)Eν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν; Θ,Φ)]
∣∣∣I]
p
−→
∑
t∈2002
∑
k∈K
Eη
[
Eθ
{
skt(I, θ; Θ,Φ)Eν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν; Θ,Φ)]
∣∣∣I}] , (17)
where 1{κit = k} is an indicator function of consumer i’s carrier choice, which equals 1 if and only
if i subscribes to carrier k at period t. The limit in the second line holds in probability when the
number of individuals with income I goes to infinity. The equality in the third line follows the
independence of θit, νit, and εikt, . The limit in the last line applies the Law of Large Numbers to
{ηkt}. To ease the notation, I have substituted the carrier-time fixed effect by the function δt(Θ,Φ)
and suppressed it in the market share function, skt(I, θ; Θ,Φ) = skt(I, θ; δt(Θ,Φ),Θ,Φ).
The second moment condition comes from the variance of the expenditure on cellular phone
service. To ease the notation, denote the average expenditure of a consumer with income I in
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period t by
MTt(I; Θ,Φ) =
∑
k∈K
Eη
[
Eθ
{
skt(I, θ; Θ,Φ)Eν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)]
∣∣I}] .
Because the observe variance is computed from annual expenditure, I need to account for the serial
correlation of ex ante taste θit over different months. Similar to the arguments used in deriving
(17), I have25
λ2EXPV (I) = Eθ
{ ∑
t∈2002
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I; Θ,Φ)Eη,ν
[
(Tkt(θ, η, ν; Θ,Φ) −MTt(I; Θ,Φ))
2
]
+ cθ
∑
t,t′∈2002
t6=t′
[(∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I; Θ,Φ)Eν [Tkt(θ, η, ν; Θ,Φ)−MTt(I; Θ,Φ)]
)
×
( ∑
k′∈K0
sk′t′(θ, I; Θ,Φ)Eη,ν [Tk′t′(θ, η, ν; Θ,Φ)−MTt′(I; Θ,Φ)]
)]∣∣∣∣I
}
(18)
for some parameter cθ ∈ [0, 1] to be estimated. This parameter increases in the serial correlation
of consumer’s ex ante tastes θit.
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For each income level I ∈ I, there are two moment conditions as described in (17) and (18).
This can be done for all grid points in the discretized income space, so I have 2|I| conditions.
Each condition contains the parameter sets Θ and Φ on the right hand side. Fix the value of the
parameter set Φ and solve for the parameter Θ from the system of these 2|I| equations. Given the
observed expenditure distribution, I can express the solution as a vector-valued function Θ(Φ).
5.4 The Condition on Total Volumes
The total volume of calls originated from carrier k in period t (normalized by the population) is
V OLkt
POPt
=
∫∫∫
skt(I, θ; δt(Θ(Φ),Φ),Θ(Φ),Φ)qkt(θ, ηkt, ν; Θ(Φ),Φ) dFν dFθ|I dFI
p
−→
∫∫
skt(I, θ; δt(Θ(Φ),Φ),Θ(Φ),Φ)Eν [qkt(θ, ηkt, ν; Θ(Φ),Φ)] dFθ|I dFI (19)
25The computational details are relegated to Appendix.
26By applying linear approximation to equation (18), the parameter cθ ≈
P
t,t′∈2002,t 6=t′ ρ
|t−t′|
θ /
P
t,t′∈2002,t 6=t′ 1
where ρθ is the monthly serial correlation of the series of ex ante tastes θit.
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The above limit holds in probability when the number of consumers goes to infinity. Note that
all parameters can now be expressed in terms of Φ. The condition 19 implicitly defines the
perceived signal index as a function of the observed volume V OLkt and the parameter set Φ,
ηkt ≡ Gkt(V OLkt/POPt; Φ).
It is easy to shows that Gkt is a well-defined, increasing function for any V OLkt > 0. First,
Eν [qkt(θ, ηkt, ν; Φ)] is a strictly increasing function in the quality index ηkt. Second, the market
share skt(I, θ; Φ) > 0 does not depends on it. As a result, the right-hand side of (19) is a monotonic
function of ηkt. Furthermore, Eν [qkt(θ, ηkt, ν)] → +∞ as ηkt → +∞ and Eν [qkt(θ, ηkt, ν)] → 0 as
ηkt → −∞. Therefore, for any V OLkt > 0, there is a unique solution of ηkt to equation (19).
5.5 Likelihood Function
Given the above results, now I can compute the cumulative distribution function of the total volume
originated from carrier k (normalized by the population).
Pr
(
V OLkt
POPt
≤ Qk; Φ
)
= Pr(ηkt < Gkt(Qk; Φ)),
whereGkt is the monotonic function implicitly defined by equation (19). Recall that ηt ∼ N(η¯t,Ση).
Define the vector functon Gt(G; Φ) ≡ (Gkt(Qk; Φ) : k ∈ K). The density function for the total
volume at period t is
lt(Q; Φ) ≡ (2pi)
−
|K|
2 |Ση|
− 1
2 exp
(
−
1
2
[Gt(Q; Φ)− η¯t]
′Σ−1η [Gt(Q; Φ)− η¯t]
)
|∇Gt(Q; Φ)|, (20)
where ∇Gt is the Jacobian of the vector function Gt.
The parameter Φ is estimated by
Φˆ = argmax
Φ
∑
t
log lt
({
V OLkt
POPt
: k ∈ K
}
; Φ
)
. (21)
Other parameters are subsequently obtained through Θˆ = Θ(Φˆ) and δˆ = δ(Θ(Φˆ), Φˆ).
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5.6 Identification
On important difference between my estimation approach and the standard method proposed in
Berry et al. (1995) is the endogeneity of prices. All the fixed-effects of subscription δkt are treated
as parameters and estimated from data. We do not need to worry about endogenous price change
resulting from unobservable carrier characteristics. Moreover, since shocks of signal qualities ηkt
are revealed after the pricing stage, price tariffs are independent of the shocks.
Identification of the model parameters is a subtle issue because they are interdependent through
the structural model. I now provide intuitions of how variations in the data identify the parameters.
For the first parameter set δ, the carrier-time fixed effect of subscription δkt is identified from the
number of subscribers in network k for a given level of surplus from making calls. Identification of
the second parameter set Θ has been mentioned in Subsection 5.3. The distribution of telecommu-
nication expenditure in the cross-sectional data is used to recover the distribution of ex ante tastes
across consumers.
The third parameter set Φ is identified as follows. The marginal disutility of expenditure α
is mainly identified from the sensitivity of demand with respect to changes in flat monthly fees.
Marginal price varies within a rate plan and across rate plans. Changes in market shares in
response to these price variations identify the scale parameter of the utility b. The parameters for
the distribution of the signal quality indices are identified from the variation of average volumes
per customer across carriers and over time. For a given tariff formula, more calls originating from
a carrier imply better perceived signal quality. Identification of the substitution parameter in
the nested logit model σε comes from change in the share of outside good relative to changes in
market shares across carriers in response to price variation. The percentage of the expenditure
on cellular service λ is identified from the difference between the average payment imputed from
the tariff formulas and the average telecommunication expenditure found in the household survey.
Similarly, the parameter for the serial correlation of ex ante tastes cθ is identified from the variance
of the tariffs imputed from the monthly output data relative to the observed variance of annual
expenditure in the survey.
Finally, since there are no data on an individual consumer’s choice in a single period, the
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variance of individual interim shock σ2ν can only be identified through functional form assumptions.
This does not affect the estimation result too much because there is only a second order effect of
these individual shocks in the aggregate level.
6 Estimation Results
In this section, I presents the empirical findings on the Taiwanese cellular phone service market
by using the method described in the previous section. After showing the estimated parameters
and their implications, I compute the switching behavior predicted by the estimated model with
the observed behavior. This comparison suggests that the assumption of zero switching costs is
innocuous. In the final part of this section, I compute demand elasticities for this market.
6.1 Estimated Parameters
The estimation results of the parameter set Φ are reported on Table 5.
Two different specifications are presented here. The mean of signal quality index η0t is assumed
to be a yearly dummy in column I.
η0t = η
0
year 1[t ∈ year],
where I normalize η2002 to be zero. In column II, I assume the mean value is a quadratic function
over time,
η0t = γ1(t− 30) + γ2(t− 30)
2,
where I normalize the value for the 30th period (October 2002) to be zero. There is no significant
difference on most parameter estimates under these two specifications. The following discussions
are based on the estimates under specification II since its likelihood is higher.
Most parameters are significantly different from zero at the 5% significance level. The marginal
disutility of payment α is positive as expected. The utility from making cellular calls is positive
since the scale parameter bˆ > 0. The estimated share of expenditure on cellular phone service
among telecommunication budget is 55.25%. The substitution parameter in the nested logit model
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Table 5: Parameter estimates of the structural model
Parameter Description I II
1000α Marginal disutility of payment 7.3258 7.2109
(0.8219) (0.6367)
0.001b Scale parameter of utility 0.6034 0.5386
(0.0652) (0.0601)
λ Share of cellular expenditure 0.5770 0.5525
(0.0152) (0.0121)
σε Substitution parameter 0.4957 0.5448
(0.1867) (0.1959)
cθ Correlation of θ over time 0.8731 0.8682
(0.0591) (0.0526)
η0TCC Quality index of TCC -0.0537 -0.0274
(0.0124) (0.0090)
η0FET Quality index of FET 0.0226 0.0198
(0.0339) (0.0291)
η0KGT Quality index of KGT -0.2301 -0.2249
(0.0236) (0.0190)
η0TAT Quality index of TAT -0.3429 -0.3457
(0.0439) (0.0372)
η0MBT Quality index of MBT -0.3370 -0.3242
(0.0290) (0.0377)
η02000 Quality index of 2000 0.2486
(0.0570)
η02001 Quality index of 2001 0.0696
(0.0318)
η02003 Quality index of 2003 -0.1087
(0.0195)
η02004 Quality index of 2004 0.0125
(0.0131)
η02005 Quality index of 2005 0.1350
(0.0318)
1000γ1 Time trend of quality index -0.6856
(0.7422)
1000γ2 Squared term of time trend 0.2937
(0.0508)
σ2η Variance of quality shock 0.1307 0.1247
(0.0137) (0.0140)
ρη Correlation of quality shock -0.0483 -0.0245
(0.0286) (0.0560)
Log-Likelihood -1735.6 -1730.4
Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses. There are 372 observations. Estimates for the
variance of individual demand shocks are close to zero (σˆν = 1.9 × 10
−4) and insignificant.
The number of grid points on the quantile space is 11× 11.
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Table 6: Signal quality difference between carriers
CHT TCC EFT KGT TAT
TCC -0.0071
(0.0024)
FET 0.0051 0.0122
(0.0075) (0.0075)
KGT -0.0579 -0.0508 -0.0630
(0.0048) (0.0033) (0.0080)
TAT -0.0890 -0.0819 -0.0941 -0.0311
(0.0098) (0.0080) (0.0118) (0.0064)
MBT -0.0835 -0.0764 -0.0886 -0.0256 0.0055
(0.0099) (0.0087) (0.0114) (0.0079) (0.0084)
Notes: The number in entry (i, j) is the monetary value of the marginal
utility of subscribing to carrier i relative to carrier j at any given quan-
tity. Standard errors are in parentheses. Unit: TWD/second.
is σˆε = 0.5448, which is significantly different from one, implying that the substitution among
carriers significantly differs from the on-off substitution. The estimated parameter of correlation
cˆθ = 0.8682 is large but significantly differs from one. This value suggests that the monthly serial
correlation of ex ante tastes is approximately 0.9670 for a given consumer.
Conditional on subscription, perceived signal quality indices differ significantly across carriers
and over time. Because the marginal utility of consuming a given quantity xijt can be expressed
in the following monetary value (TWD per second)
θit + ηkt + νit − log xijt
αb
, (22)
quality differences can be expressed by the monetary value of the difference in marginal utility for
any fixed quantity xijt. Table 6 reports the difference between any pair of carriers. The estimated
quality indices tend to be positively correlated with market shares. Far Eastone and Chunghua
Telecom provide the highest marginal utility values without significant difference between them.
They are followed by Taiwan Cellular. KG Telecommunication is the next. The two regional
networks, Mo Bi Tai and Trans Asia, give consumers the lowest marginal values on phone calls.
Furthermore, the mean signal quality index also changes over time. It declines 0.0405 Taiwan
dollars per second between December 2000 and December 2002 before the index rebounds 0.0465
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Figure 4: Mean of ex ante taste conditional on income
Taiwan dollars between December 2002 and December 2004. Comparing to marginal prices, quality
differences across carriers and over time are both considerable.27
Interim quality shocks are important in the volume decision. The estimated variance of the
quality shock, σˆ2η = 0.1247, is significantly positive. By using the measure defined in (22), a
positive shock with one standard deviation would increase the marginal utility by 0.0909 Taiwan
dollars per second. Equivalently, the volume would raise 42.4% under linear pricing.28
The parameters for the conditional distribution of ex ante tastes θ is obtained from Θˆ = Θ(Φˆ)
(defined in Section 5.3).
The estimated conditional means µˆθ|I , are shown in Figure 4.
29As expected, the conditional
mean increases in income I. A consumer in a wealthy household tends to use more cellular phone
service, ceteris paribus. Specifically, an individual in a 90% income percentile household on average
27The median in-network and off-network prices among all plans are 0.07 and 0.13 Taiwan dollars per second,
respectively.
28In practice, because the tariff formula has kinks, the increase in volume could be much smaller.
29The magnitude of the ex ante taste type θit can be interpreted in terms of marginal utility. Suppose the interim
shocks, ηkt and νit, are both zero. The mean of θit is −8.6324 at the median income, which means the marginal
utility is 0.0721 Taiwan dollars per second for a consumer who makes 50 minutes of calls in the entire month of
October 2002.
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Figure 5: Standard deviation of ex ante taste conditional on income
values a second of cellular service 0.0629 Taiwan dollars more than a person in a 10% income
percentile household. This difference would imply 27.7% more calling volume under linear pricing.
Furthermore, after controlling for the household income, consumers still differ in their calling taste.
Figure 5 presents the estimated standard deviations conditional on income. The estimated
standard deviations σˆθ|I are significantly positive, but there is no clear relationship between the
standard deviations and income. There is substantial variation of ex ante tastes among consumers.
The variance among all consumers is 0.0818, which implies the standard deviation of marginal
utility is 0.0736 Taiwan dollars per second for any given quantity. Income variation can accounts
for 9.38% of the taste variation.
Finally, the carrier-time fixed effects for subscription can be obtained from δˆt = δt(Θ(Φˆ), Φˆ)
(defined in Section 5.2).
In Figure 6, the estimated fixed effects are expressed in their monetary values δˆkt/αˆ. Relative to
the outside option, the median surplus from subscription is about -1166 Taiwan dollars. As a result,
for a consumer who does not want to make any outgoing phone call, the hassle cost of connecting
to a GSM network (e.g. the cost of buying a handset) outweighs its value (e.g. receiving incoming
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Figure 6: Carrier-time fixed effects for subscription
phone calls) when the value of outside choice is normalized to zero. The value of this fixed effect
generally increases between 2000 and 2002. This is consistent with the time when carriers reduced
activation fees to zero. On the contrary, the decline in the second half of the research period may
reflect the effect due to entry of non-GSM wireless phone services (PHS and 3G). Note that while
Far Eastone has the highest signal quality index η0FET and Trans Asia has the lowest index η
0
TAT ,
the order is reversed for the fixed effects δFETt and δTATt. The median surplus of subscribing to
Far Eastone is -1290 Taiwan dollars, while that of subscribing to Trans Asia is -843 Taiwan dollars.
6.2 Validation Test: Churn Rates
A potentially crucial assumption imposed on my estimation model is that consumers incur no
switching costs from one period to another. One way to evaluate the restrictiveness of the assump-
tion is to perform an out-of-sample test. I compare the churn rates predicted by the simulated model
with the churn rates observed in the market. This is a very rigorous test because my estimation
does not use any information about churn rates in the market.
The estimated parameter cθ suggests the monthly serial correlation of ex ante tastes is 0.9670,
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Figure 7: Monthly churn rates for Chunghua Telecom
but my estimation does not give any information on the serial correlation of a consumer’s idiosyn-
cratic preferences over various carriers. To compute the churn rates from the estimated model, I
assume the preferences are fixed over time (εikt = εikt′) for all individuals.
Figure 7 shows the observed and simulated monthly churn rates for Chunghua Telecom.30 The
predicted and observed churn rates are very close. The two series are very similar in magnitude,
overall shape, and month-to-month variation, especially toward the end of the research period.
My estimation generates these churn rates reasonably well. Consequently, the assumption of zero
switching costs seems innocuous. The intuition behind the result is the following. Switching costs
have no effect if a consumer does not want to switch. Since consumer tastes are highly correlated
over time, only very few of them want to change their carriers from one month to another. Therefore,
by imposing the simplification of zero switching costs, I can use the static model to approximate
the real world with little bias and avoid solving a complicated dynamic problem.
30I have detailed data on monthly churn rates only for this carrier. The data are obtained from Operation Data for
Most Recent 12 Months on the Chunghua Telecom website (http://www.cht.com.tw/CompanyCat.php?CatID=274).
The data are available since September 2001.
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Table 7: Median own- and cross-price elasticities
CHT TCC FET KGT TAT MBT
Number of Subscribers
CHT -6.1833 2.0250 1.5163 0.8312 0.1887 0.1453
TCC 2.6116 -6.2190 1.4236 0.8643 0.2127 0.1430
FET 2.5408 1.9042 -6.9853 0.8514 0.2189 0.1413
KGT 1.9465 1.5319 1.1093 -5.9524 0.2482 0.1358
TAT 1.0932 1.0569 0.7411 0.6123 -4.2726 0.0000
MBT 1.6494 1.6294 1.1573 0.8024 0.0000 -5.9762
Total Volume
CHT -6.5359 2.1548 1.6414 0.8135 0.1747 0.1444
TCC 3.0040 -6.9363 1.5860 0.8412 0.1806 0.1452
FET 2.8856 2.0747 -7.7912 0.8518 0.1927 0.1427
KGT 2.3720 1.7760 1.2682 -6.5036 0.2204 0.1365
TAT 1.2545 1.2224 0.8428 0.6736 -4.9977 0.0000
MBT 2.0764 1.8892 1.4045 0.8437 0.0000 -6.7509
Note: Cell entries (i, j), where i indexes row and j column, give the percentage
change in network i with respect to a 1% proportional price change of network
j. Each entry represents the median of the elasticities from 62 periods.
6.3 Demand Elasticities
I use the estimated model to compute demand elasticities. Since pricing schemes are nonlinear, the
payments are determined by several elements: in-network and off-network prices and free allowances
as well as monthly fees. To compute demand elasticities, I consider a proportional increase in the
tariff formula, holding free allowances fixed. The median industry-wide demand elasticity over time
for a proportional change in price schemes is -1.1217 for the number of subscribers and -1.3394 for
the total volume. Because increase in price would reduce the number of subscribers and the usage
of the remaining customers, the latter elasticity is greater than the former one (in absolute value).
My estimated elasticities are close to the results found in previous researches on the U.S. market.31
The demand elasticities for each carrier are presented in Table 7. The demand is elastic for all
carriers. While all other carriers have similar own-price elasticities, Trans Asia has a substantial
lower elasticity. This suggests the service of Trans Asia is more differentiated away from the other
31For example, Parker and Ro¨ller (1997) estimate the elasticity at -2.46 in a linear regression model for U.S. cellular
market between 1984 and 1988, but volume choice is abstracted away in their study. Narayanan et al. (2007) find
the usage elasticity in a monopolistic landline telephone market ranges between -1.76 and -1.92, depending on their
models.
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five carriers. Besides, price change of a large network has a stronger impact on rival networks than
that of a small network. This is primary due to network effects.
7 Counterfactual Simulations
Based on the behavior model, I perform two counterfactual simulations to evaluate the effects of
termination-based pricing on the market structure. The first one consider the overall effects of
in-network discounts. The second one quantifies the effects caused by the substitution between
in-network and off-network calls resulting from the price difference. Nonetheless, one needs to be
cautious in interpreting these results. Carriers may respond to policy changes by adjusting their
tariffs, so the market equilibrium may change. This response is ignored in the following simulations.
7.1 Evaluation of Intra-Network Discounts
For a given percentage of in-network discounts, the average price of a rate plan in a large network
reduces more than that in a small network because there is a higher probability of making an
in-network call. Consumers are more likely to subscribe to a rate plan offered by a large carrier.
The first column of Table 8 is the actual outcome in October of 2002. Suppose in-network
discounts are not allowed and all calls (exceeding the free allowance thresholds) are priced at the
observed off-network rate. The simulated result is on the second column of the table. While the
average price goes up, the average consumption goes down. Consumer surplus reduces by 8.8%.
There are large impacts on the relative market shares. The variation of network sizes among the
carriers becomes much less when the in-network discounts are eliminated. For instance, the largest
carrier, CHT, loses 23% of its subscribers, but the smallest one, MBT, gains 32%. Meanwhile, the
revenue of CHT decreases by 20%, but that of MBT increases by 38%. The market shares of the
four national carriers become much close.
Figure 8 shows the HHI measured in total volume for each period. The difference between the
two curves reflects the effect of in-network discounts. When in-network discounts are eliminated, the
median change in the indices is −218 points. The quartiles are −257 and −184 points. Although
there is no clear guidance to interpret the change in HHI due to price discrimination, the U.S.
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Table 8: Counterfactual simulation on no in-network discount
Actual Simulated
Average Usage (minutes) 35.641 33.343
Average Expenditure (TWD) 258.261 254.821
Average Expected Consumer Surplus (TWD) 170.121 155.228
Number of Subscribers (millions)
CHT 3.325 2.570
TCC 2.796 2.535
FET 1.927 1.928
KGT 1.694 1.856
TAT 0.795 0.892
MBT 0.326 0.429
Total 10.862 10.210
Aggregate Volume (million minutes)
CHT 276.325 204.716
TCC 199.680 183.162
FET 129.511 129.033
KGT 134.292 157.011
TAT 39.846 45.125
MBT 22.135 31.036
Total 801.788 750.083
Revenue (billion TWD)
CHT 1.908 1.534
TCC 1.371 1.335
FET 0.955 1.002
KGT 1.031 1.195
TAT 0.376 0.436
MBT 0.168 0.231
Total 5.810 5.733
Note: Calculated for October of 2002.
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Note: Intra-network discounts are eliminated in the simulation.
Figure 8: Simulated market concentration rates without discounts
Department of Justice (1994)’s horizontal merger guidelines says “Where the post-merger HHI
exceeds 1800, it will be presumed that mergers producing an increase in the HHI of more than 100
points are likely to create or enhance market power or facilitate its exercise.” The change in HHI
is large according to this standard. The median change of the concentration rate due to in-network
discounts is equivalent to a horizontal merger between two firms with 10.4% market shares.
7.2 Evaluation of Carrier Recognizability
I now consider the case in which consumers cannot recognize the carrier of a receiver from the
phone number. For example, after number portability is introduced into the market, consumers
can switch to a different cellular carrier without changing the phone number.32 The prefix of a
phone number is not a valid indicator for the carrier. Alternatively, if phone numbers are not
assigned to carriers with easily distinguishable prefixes, such as in the U.S. cellular service market,
it is difficult for consumers to know the carrier of a receiver from the phone number.
32Here, number portability is interpreted as jeopardizing the ability to recognize the carrier of a phone number.
The main objective of this policy, however, is to reduce consumer’s switching costs among carriers. I do not consider
switching costs in this paper.
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By eliminating the ability to recognize the carrier of a receiver, it is impossible to choose
calling volumes according to the termination of a phone call. Consumers cannot substitute between
in-network and off-network calls. The price difference between in-network and off-network calls
does not affect consumption. Only the average price matters. Without loss of generality, assume
aIpt/N
I
pt ≥ a
O
pt/N
O
pt . Let Nt = N
I
pt +N
O
pt be the total number of receivers. The demand function of
a type θit consumer with shocks (ηkt, νit) for a give plan p becomes
xpt(θit, ηkt, νit) =


exp (θit + ηkt + νit) , if ηkt + νit < B1(θit)
aOpt
NOpt
, if B1(θit) ≤ ηkt + νit < B2(θit)
exp
(
θit + ηkt + νit − αbp¯
O
pt
)
, if B2(θit) ≤ ηkt + νit < B3(θit)
aIpt
NIpt
, if B3(θit) ≤ ηkt + νit < B4(θit)
exp (θit + ηkt + νit − αbp¯pt) , if ηkt + νit ≥ B4(θit)
,
where p¯pt = (N
I
ptp
I
pt +N
O
ptp
O
pt)/Nt, p¯
O
pt = N
O
ptp
O
pt/Nt and the boundaries are
B1(θit) ≡ log
(
aOpt
NOpt
)
− θit , B2(θit) ≡ log
(
aOpt
NOpt
)
− θit + αbp¯
O
pt ,
B3(θit) ≡ log
(
aIpt
N Ipt
)
− θit + αbp¯
O
pt , and B4(θit) ≡ log
(
aIpt
N Ipt
)
− θit + αbp¯pt .
Both in-network and off-network prices enter demand function only indirectly through their aver-
ages. The tariff is
T˜pt(θit, ηkt, νit) =MFpt
+ 1{B2(θit ≤ ηkt + νit < B3(θit)}
[
p¯OptNte
θit+ηkt+νit−αbp¯
O
pt − pOpta
O
pt
]
+ 1{B3(θit ≤ ηkt + νit < B4(θit)}p¯
O
ptNt
(
aIpt
N Ipt
−
aOpt
NOpt
)
+ 1{ηkt + νit ≥ B4(θit)}
[
p¯ptNte
θit+ηkt+νit−αbp¯pt − pOpta
O
pt − p
I
pta
I
pt
]
.
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The surplus from calling is
µ˜pt(θit, ηkt, νit) = −αMFpt + 1{ηkt + νit < B1}
[
Nt
b
eθit+ηkt+νit
]
+ 1{B1 ≤ ηkt + νit < B2}
Nta
O
pt
bNOpt
[
θit + ηkt + νit + 1− log
(
aOpt
NOpt
)]
+ 1{B2 ≤ ηkt + νit < B3}
[
Nt
b
eθit+ηkt+νit−αbp¯
O
pt + αpOpta
O
pt
]
+1{B3≤ηkt+νit<B4}
[
Nta
I
pt
bN Ipt
(
θit+ηkt+νit+1−log
(
aIpt
N Ipt
))
−αNtp¯
O
pt
(
aIpt
N Ipt
−
aOpt
NOpt
)]
+ 1{ηkt + νit ≥ B4}
[
Nt
b
eθit+ηkt+νit−αbp¯pt + α
(
pOpta
O
pt + p
I
pta
I
pt
)]
.
Table 9 compares the actual outcome with the simulated one for October 2002. The differences
are small. Consumers are slightly worse off when they cannot recognize the carrier of a phone
receiver. The average expected consumer surplus drops by 0.8%. The market shares are more
evenly distributed among carriers. Chunghua Telecom loses 1.6% of subscribers while Mo Bi Tai
gains 2.1%.
As Figure 9 shows, there is little change on the HHI over the entire research period.33 The
median change in HHI over time is marely -3.1 points.
Compare this simulation with the previous one. Most of the “tipping effects” on the market
shares due to intra-network discounts can be attributed to lowering the average prices. To quantify
the effect directly from the price difference, I eliminate the substitution between in-network and off-
network calls in the second counterfactual simulation. There is little effect on the market structure
resulting directly from the price difference.
8 Conclusion
In the telecommunications industry, firms often provide a menu of optional rate plans. Because
plan choice and volume choice are temporally separated, consumers can adjust their behaviors
33Because of interim shocks, the HHI measured in total volumes may increase even when the HHI measured in the
number of subscribers decreases. In fact, the latter index always decreases when carriers are not recognizable from
phone numbers.
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Table 9: Counterfactual simulation on carrier recognizability
Actual Simulated
Average Usage (minutes) 35.641 35.538
Average Expenditure (TWD) 258.261 258.818
Average Expected Consumer Surplus (TWD) 170.121 168.779
Number of Subscribers (millions)
CHT 3.325 3.272
TCC 2.796 2.786
FET 1.927 1.923
KGT 1.694 1.694
TAT 0.795 0.795
MBT 0.326 0.333
Total 10.862 10.803
Aggregate Volume (million minutes)
CHT 276.325 273.008
TCC 199.680 200.185
FET 129.511 129.014
KGT 134.292 134.711
TAT 39.846 39.833
MBT 22.135 22.729
Total 801.788 799.480
Revenue (billion TWD)
CHT 1.908 1.891
TCC 1.371 1.380
FET 0.955 0.959
KGT 1.031 1.041
TAT 0.376 0.379
MBT 0.168 0.172
Total 5.810 5.822
Note: Calculated for October 2002.
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Note: Consumers cannot recognize the carrier of a phone receiver in the sim-
ulation.
Figure 9: Simulated market concentration rates with carrier recognizability
after learning new information. This paper develops a framework to analyze such an environment
by using carrier-level data. Because consumers choose different quantity of the service, market
shares measured by the number of subscribers differ from those computed from the traffic volume.
I combine these two measures of market shares in the estimation to identify consumers’ two-
stage decisions on plan and volume. Moreover, household survey data are incorporated to identify
consumer heterogeneities. Estimation is based on a preference-based structural model. I apply
the method to analyze the cellular phone service market in Taiwan. Although switching costs are
abstracted away in my model, the estimated model predicts churn rates similar to those observed
in the real world. I use the estimated results to evaluate the effect of termination-based pricing
schemes on the market structure. Intra-network discounts substantially increase the concentration
rate in this highly concentrated market. However, the effects are primarily caused by lower average
prices. The effects of the discounts per se are very small. Even though my counterfactual analysis
only considers the demand side and is not an equilibrium analysis, the small effects imply that
carriers would only change their tariffs slightly if termination-based pricing schemes is prohibited.
This paper focuses on consumer demand, taking price schedules as given. A more compre-
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hensive analysis including carriers’ pricing decision is important for future research. In addition,
even though my empirical results suggest that switching costs only have modest effects on the sub-
scription decisions, a dynamic model is needed to formally quantify the effects. Another important
future extension is to relax the assumption of balanced calling pattern so that a group of consumers
who often make calls to each other may coordinate their subscription decisions to take advantage
of in-network discounts.
A Appendix: The Condition on the Variance of Expenditure
I will show that the condition on the conditional expenditure variance can be expressed as
λ2EXPV (I) = Eθ
{ ∑
t∈2002
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I; Θ,Φ)Eη,ν
[
(Tkt(θ, η, ν)−MTt(I))
2
]
+cθ
∑
t,t′∈2002
t6=t′
[ ∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν [Tkt(θ, η, ν)−MTt(I)]
][ ∑
k′∈K0
sk′t′(θ, I)Eη,ν [Tk′t′(θ, η, ν)−MTt′(I)]
]∣∣∣∣I
}
(23)
for some parameter cθ to be estimated. This parameter is increasing in the serial correlation of
consumer’s ex ante taste θit.
In this appendix, I will consider two extreme cases. The first one is the case with fully correlated
ex ante taste, θit = θi for all t in the year 2002. The parameter cθ = 1 in this case. In the second
case, the ex ante taste is assumed to be independent over time. Then, cθ = 0. In general, the
correlation of ex ante taste is between the two extreme cases, and I have cθ∈ (0, 1).
A.1 Case One
When the interim taste shock εikt is independent over t, I have
Pr(κit = k, κit′ = k
′|θi) = Pr(κit = k|θi)× Pr(κit′ = k
′|θi), for any k, k
′ and t 6= t′.
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By the definition conditional variance, for an income level I,
λ2EXPV (I) ≡
1
#{i : Ii = I}
∑
{i:Ii=I}

 ∑
t∈2002
∑
k∈K0
1{κit = k}Tkt(θit, ηkt, νit)− λEXPM (I)


2
.
Recall that MTt(I) =
∑
k∈K Eη[Eθ{skt(I, θ)Eν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)]|I}] denotes the expected expenditure
of a consumer with income I at period t. Plugging in the condition on expenditure mean (17), I
obtain
λ2EXPV (I) =
1
#{i : Ii = I}
∑
{i:Ii=I}


∑
t∈2002

∑
k∈K0
1{κit = k}Tkt(θit, ηkt, νit)−MTt(I)




2
=
1
#{i : Ii = I}
∑
{i:Ii=I}
{ ∑
t∈2002
[ ∑
k∈K0
1{κit = k}Tkt(θit, ηkt, νit)−MTt(I)
]2
+
∑
t,t′∈2002
t6=t′
[ ∑
k∈K0
1{κit = k}Tkt(·)−MTt(I)
][ ∑
k′∈K0
1{κit′ = k
′}Tk′t′(·)−MTt′(I)
]}
.
As the number of consumers with income level I goes to infinity, the above equation converge in
probability to
Eθ,ν,ε
{ ∑
t∈2002
[ ∑
k∈K0
1{κit = k}Tkt(θit, ηkt, νit)−MTt(I)
]2
+
∑
t,t′∈2002
t6=t′
[ ∑
k∈K0
1{κit = k}Tkt(·)−MTt(I)
][ ∑
k′∈K0
1{κit′ = k
′}Tk′t′(·)−MTt′(I)
]∣∣∣∣I
}
Because of the independence of εikt, θit, and νit, it equals
Eθ
{ ∑
t∈2002
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν
[
(Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I))
2
]
+
∑
t,t′∈2002
t6=t′
[ ∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν [Tkt(·)−MTt(I)]
][ ∑
k′∈K0
sk′t′(θ, I)Eν [Tk′t′(·)−MTt′(I)]
]∣∣∣∣I
}
(24)
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The following lemma shows that the Law of Large Numbers can be applied to equation (24).
Lemma 1. Suppose ηkt is independent over time t. As |T | goes to infinity,
1
|T |2
{∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν
[
(Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I))
2
]
+
∑
t,t′∈T
t6=t′
[ ∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I)]
][ ∑
k′∈K0
sk′t′(θ, I)Eν [Tk′t′(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt′(I)]
]}
(25)
converges in probability to
1
|T |2
{∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)EηEν
[
(Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I))
2
]
+
∑
t,t′∈T
t6=t′
[ ∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)EηEν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I)]
][ ∑
k′∈K0
sk′t′(θ, I)EηEν [Tk′t′(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt′(I)]
]}
.
(26)
Proof. The second term in (1) can be expressed as
∑
t,t′∈T
t6=t′
[ ∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I)]
][ ∑
k′∈K0
sk′t′(θ, I)Eν [Tk′t′ −MTt′(I)]
]
=

∑
t∈T
[ ∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I)]
]
2
−
∑
t∈T
[ ∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I)]
]2
By the independence of ηkt over t, the Law of Large Numbers implies
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν
[
(Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I))
2
]
p
−→
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)EηEν
[
(Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I))
2
]
,
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I)]
p
−→
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)EηEν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I)],
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and
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
[∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I)]
]2
p
−→
1
|T |
∑
t∈T
[∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)EηEν [Tkt(θ, ηkt, ν)−MTt(I)]
]2
.
Combining the above results, the probability limit stated in this lemma can be obtained after
algebraic simplification.
Using the result in Lemma 1, I obtain the following condition.
λ2EXPV (I) = Eθ
{ ∑
t∈2002
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eη,ν
[
(Tkt(θ, η, ν)−MTt(I))
2
]
+
∑
t,t′∈2002
t6=t′
[ ∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eν [Tkt(θ, η, ν)−MTt(I)]
][ ∑
k′∈K0
sk′t′(θ, I)Eη,ν [Tk′t′(θ, η, ν)−MTt′(I)]
]∣∣∣∣I
}
. (27)
A.2 Case Two
Next, consider the other extreme case. Suppose ex ante taste θit is independent over time t. The
reasoning is similar to the previous case. However, because
Eθt,θt′
{[∑
k∈K0
skt(θt, I)Eν [Tkt(θt, η, ν)−MTt(I)]
][ ∑
k′∈K0
sk′t′(θt′ , I)Eη,ν [Tk′t′(θt′ , η, ν)−MTt′ (I)]
]∣∣∣∣I
}
=Eθt
{∑
k∈K0
skt(θt, I)Eν [Tkt(θt, η, ν)−MTt(I)]
∣∣∣∣I
}
Eθt′
{ ∑
k′∈K0
sk′t′(θt′ , I)Eη,ν [Tk′t′(θt′ , η, ν)−MTt′ (I)]
∣∣∣∣I
}
= 0
for any t 6= t′, the second term on the right hand side of the equation (27) disappears in this case.
The condition becomes
λ2EXPV (I) = Eθ
[ ∑
t∈2002
∑
k∈K0
skt(θ, I)Eη,ν
[
(Tkt(θ, η, ν)−MTt(I))
2
] ∣∣∣∣I
]
.
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